Showing posts with label SOUTH ASIA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SOUTH ASIA. Show all posts

Sunday, 19 February 2012

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE XVI SAARC SUMMIT's ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH

THE FRAMEWORK OF THE XVI SAARC SUMMIT's ENVIRONMENTAL APPROACH

By, Pedro Lara de Arruda.

Introduction

The 2010 Summit of South-Asia Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Thimphu (Buthan) has been considered a unique moment in the history of regional policies toward environmental protection and climate change preventive measures. Despite the fact that the very theme of the meeting was directly and explicitly addressing the environmental cause as it main goal - “Towards a green and happy South-Asia”, it was also markable that the previous SAARC comuniques and pronunciations regarding good practices on environmental issues finally took the first step in the direction of becoming more binding agreements, specially in light of the SAARC Convention in Cooperation on Environment (which was signalled by all the countries but still waits for the ratification).

Despite the cognitive value of launching one such distinguished agenda centred on issues like well-being and environmental protection, what certainly affects the cultural strengths behind the policy-making processes in all the levels (domestic, regional, and even global), there's also the necessity of acknowledging the shift from the previous soft approach given by the SAARC to environmental issue to a more committed one, which even expressed the conscious will of extending the South-Asian agenda to international organizations and global negotiations on that issue (like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process – UNFCCC). To notice one such shift in the SAARC approach to environmental issues one must first take a look to the historical approach of the organization on the issue.



Early approaches to environmentalism in the history of SAARC



As early as 1987 the Heads of State or Government of SAARC were already addressing in a systematic way the necessity to intensify regional cooperation for preserving, protecting and managing the ecosystems of the region, which are well known for its diversity as well as for its fragility. Besides this natural condition of fragility framing the South-Asian environmental reality – marked in the risk of Himalayan melting and subsequent flood of Bangladesh, by the delicate river sharing between Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh, or else by the over-exposure of the Maldives to tide and ocean variations –, the debates held through the SAARC organization still in its early days raised an early consciousness regarding the intensification of such process which could be represented by abnormal phenomenas caused by deregulated human activities, like the Global Warm and the Greenhouse Effects, as well as environmental disasters caused by both, human intervention and natural causes (SAARC, 2010a). Also relevant to mention, this early acknowledgements were already aware that the environmental loss should be also accounted regarding their direct effects on harming the sovereignty and development capabilities of the affected countries, therefore unfolding the path for the securitization of environmentalism in the region. Here, it's important to notice the early securitization of environmentalism under the SAARC by avoiding further brute critiques on the SAARC as a merely rhetorical institution without no real and concrete effects since the very non-material process of securitization is much more a matter of cognitive processes and cultural formation which, however, can lead to undeniable material outcomes as, for instance, the inclusion of certain marginalized issues in the top of the state agenda – as is being the case with environmentalism.



The institutionalization process



A landmark on the institutionalization of the SAARC approach to environmentalism according to our previous description come in this very year of 1987, during the Third SAARC Summit, held in Kathmandu (Nepal), from November the 2nd to the 4th. As an outcome of the debates and expression of this shared perceptions mentioned above the Summit demanded a study on Natural Disasters and Environment Preservation, entitled: “Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment”. This study would be carried by many specialists and its final report would come out only in 1991. The exert bellow brings out its Terms of Reference:



  1. Country-wise identification and study of natural disasters, their nature, extent, causes and consequences;

  2. Country-wise identification of different aspects of environmental degradation, the causes thereof and their implications for natural disasters which undermine the development process;

  3. Country-wise survey of existing programmes for (a) the management of disasters including prevention/mitigation/ relief and rehabilitation; and, (b) the protection, conservation and restoration of the environment;

  4. Identification of specific areas of national priority requiring further action;

  5. Identification of common areas of regional concern; and,

  6. Identification of measures and programmes at the regional level, for strenghtening disaster management capabilities and for the protection and preservation of the environment of the Member Countries to supplement national, bilateral, regional and global efforts.

(SAARC, 1991, p. 1-2)



Intensifying the importance of the environmental issues and in line with the global worries regarding the Global Warming effect, the 1988 SAARC Summit, held in Islamabad, in December, requested a joint study entitled, “Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region” (SAARC, 1992), which was extremely technical and brought up valuable official knowledge to orient the policy-making towards some most serious challenges, such as:





  1. Sea level rise: A 1m sea level rise due to global warming is likely to cause major problems in the intensely utilized and densely populated coastal plains producing coastline recession of up to several kilometers, submergins coastal villages and depriving many people of their land and resources. Some of the island countries in the world may be affected seriously.

  2. Tropical cyclones: As sea surface temperature raises, the ocean area which can spawn tropical cyclones (typhoons, hurricanes etc) is expected to increase. However, although the area of sea having temperature itself may increase in a warmer world. Some scientists argue that the intensity of these storms may increase.

  3. Flood: Floods are already a major ongoing concern of many developing countries, and this problem may be exacerbated by global climatic change. Some climate model projections suggest that the greenhouse effect will enhance both ends of the hydrologic cycle, producing more instances of extreme rainfall as well as increased drought. In some instances, the expected rise of sea level may aggravate the vulnerability of coastal countries to submerge.

  4. Drought or water shortages: As global warming occurs, frought may become a much greater problem. Global warming may be expected in some regions to lower the groundwater level, increase salinity due to the evaporation, decrease in surface of many lakes or inland waters ways, and drop in the water level of such bodies.

  5. Loss of Biomass: A major threat to developing countries posed by global warming may be acceleration of depletion of biomass cover as a result of increased drought.

  6. Rapid Thawing of the Permafrost: Climate models have generally projected that arctic and subarctic areas are likely to warm more rapidly than the average global temperature increase. Such a rapid warming would result in a significant thwing of the permafros in the subarctic, producing more disruption to buildings, roads and bridges, adversely affecting the stability of some existing structures and forcing changes in construction practice.



Migration and resettlement may be the most threatening short-term effects of climate change on human settlements... (SAARC, 1992, p. 17-18).



This study would be finished in 1992 and, along with the previous study on Natural Disaster they would last for many years as the main guidelines of environmental policies to be undertaken in the regional level.

Those early efforts to jointly produce information on environmental issues would very soon raise the importance of creating institutions to handle the suggested means of a joint environmental preventive care of the natural resources, as well as to act collectively on remedying the environmental disaster affecting the region. In light of the conclusion of the study required in 1988 and only one year after the study required in 1987 was also finished, the SAARC established a general Technical Committee on Environmental issues and a specific Technical Committe on Environment and Forestry (SAARC, 2010a).

The general Committee on Environment originally had a mandate to monitor the progress made in the implementation of the recommendations of the two Regional Studies, particularly aiming at: Examining the recommendations of the Regional Studies; identifying measures for immediate action; and deciding on modalities for the implementation. Latter on, however, this original mandate would be expanded to update new environmental issues and new mechanisms and suggestions on handling them, of what the Dhaka Declaration and the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change would be representatives (SAARC, 2010a).

The specific Technical Committe, however, was first launched aiming only the implementation of measures suggested in the 1991 study - “Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment” -, which basically concerned identifying measures for immediate action and deciding modalities for implementation of those particular issues addressed in the study of 1991. However, this specific Committe further extended its mandate to the implementation of measures mentioned in the 1992 study - “Greenhouse Effect and its Impact on the Region”, and, in many aspects started overlapping responsibilities with the general Technical Committee, even though the Technical Commission remained much more concerned with practical technical issues than with political decisions, which were a main duty of the the general Committee (SAARC, 2010a).

As part of the same expansion process which somehow merged the general Committe with the Technical Committe, the Technical Committee was further given the responsibility of carrying out measures to implement good practices on the fields of meteorology and forestry, what would lead to the formal merging of this Comittee with a third one, not originally under the umbrella of the SAARC environmental mechanisms and still not mentioned here – the Technical Committee on Science and Technology. This last merge would come into practice in 2004 despite have being approved in 2003 under the restructured Regional Integrated Programe of Action (RIPA) launched by the Twenty-ninth Session of the Standing Committee in Islamabad (December, 2004). A clear understand of the precise mandate of those merged institutions is given by the SAARC official website just as follows:



Since 2004, the Technical Committee on Environment and Forestry has met three times in June 2004, May 2006 and January 2009. The sectoral mandate of the Technical Committee comprises of environment, forestry and natural disasters. In addition to the Terms of Reference outlined under Article VI of the SAARC Charter, the Technical Committee follows-up on the implementation of decisions taken by SAARC Charter Bodies (Summit, Council of Ministers, Standing Committee) and the SAARC Environment Ministers. The coordination and monitoring of the implementation of the 1997 SAARC Environment Action Plan; and SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (July 2008) are also entrusted to the Technical Committee. The Fourth Meeting of the Technical Committee on Environment and Forestry [took] place in Thimphu, Bhutan on 17-18 May 2011. (SAARC, 2010a)



Parallel to those Committees the Environment Ministers of the SAARC members also started to meet periodically since 1992 with the precise objective of following the progress and further enhance regional cooperation in the areas of environment, climate change and natural disasters, specially regarding the Study Recommendations and the Committee implementation measures. Since 1992 the SAARC Environment Ministers have met nine times besides their presence in the Special Session of the Environment Ministers in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami (Malé, 2005) and in the SAARC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change (Dhaka, 2008).

One of the most important of the nine Environment Ministerial Meetings already held by SAARC was the Third one, held in Male (1997). At that occasion they approved and Environmental Action Plan which strengthened the comprehensive approach of the previous two studies and also updated issues of concern to the SAARC members, besides unfolding some line of patterns to foster further implementation of measures (SAARC, 2010a).

Here it's important to note how relevant were the technical issues raised by this Environmental Action Plan and their respective mechanisms of implementation, which are largely recognized as successful for they soon originated concrete institutions such as: The SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center (SCZMC), which was established 2004 to promote cooperation in planning, management and sustainable development of coastal zones, including research, training and awareness in the region; the SAARC Forestry Center (SFC), which was established in Thimphu in 2007 for the protection, conservation and prudent use of forest resources by adopting sustainable forest management practices through research, education and coordination among Member States; the South-Asia Environment Outlook (SAEO) which was finalized in 2009, during the Eight Meeting of the SAARC Environment Ministers, in collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); and, through more indirect ways, even the SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment as stipulated under Item 17 (Legal Framework) of the Action Plan, which was signed during the Sixteenth SAARC Summit (2010) and will enter into force after being ratified by all Member States.

Of special relevance to the XVI SAARC Summit was the 8th Environment Ministerial Meeting held in Delhi (2009), for it adopted the Delhi Statement on Cooperation in Environment which identifies many critical areas that need to be addressed and reaffirms the commitment of Member States towards enhancing regional cooperation in the area of environment and climate change. Some of the main points of this document were summed in the Delhi Statement of which some exerts follow bellow:

Environmental Planning & Management

1. The Ministers recognized the critical importance of effective planning and management of environmental protection systems, including environmental pollution, and conservation of aquatic and marine ecosystems. They emphasized the need for cooperation in devising measures to develop capability for enhanced environmental management.

2. The Ministers appreciated and acknowledged the support of India in SAARC Meteorological Research Centre (SMRC) and reaffirmed the decision of SMRC to set up a network of SAARC weather stations to monitor weather patterns, especially storms, across the member states, starting with the establishment of fifty automatic weather stations, three GPS Sonde Stations and a Doppler Radar in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh in the first phase. Afghanistan and Pakistan would be covered in second phase with Maldives and Sri Lanka in the third phase. They directed that the deployment of this network across other member states be accelerated.

3. The Ministers agreed to accelerate consultations between the apex environmental management and pollution control agencies of the Member States (“apex group”), and directed that they develop a Regional Cooperation Plan on environmental management and pollution control within a period of six months from the date of adoption of this statement.

Biodiversity and Afforestation

4. The Ministers noted the critical need to conserve, preserve, rehabilitate and protect the rich, varied and unique biodiversity of the South Asia region. They noted the need for biodiversity protection and regulation, including through scientific methods.

5. The Ministers re-affirmed the importance of the region’s forests as a unique treasure, both for their rich biodiversity and for the livelihood they provide to the forest-dependent people of South Asia. They emphasized the need to give a new impetus to afforestation and the sustainable management of forests and its resources, including through community- based methods.

6. The Ministers emphasized the need to identify transboundary biodiversity zones and develop a framework for transboundary biodiversity conservation, including exploration of potential biodiversity conservation corridors. The Ministers directed the Technical Committee on Environment to examine the Concept and develop a framework for consideration of member states within a period of six months thereof.

7. The Ministers underlined the need for afforestation and sustainable management of forests to be an integral part of any agreement on forestry that is concluded under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They emphasized that the “REDD Plus” proposal before the UNFCCC is an appropriate basis for such an agreement.

Climate Change

8. The Ministers recognized that the South Asia was amongst the regions most vulnerable to climate change. They stressed that sustainable development and adaptation to Climate Change remained the

appropriate way to address the threat of climate change. They agreed that it was central, including through acceleration of the development process, to build up capacity in the region to cope with the extreme weather events and other adverse effects of climate change.

9. The Ministers recalled the SAARC Declaration on Climate Change adopted by the Twenty-ninth Session of the Council of Ministers held in New Delhi on 7-8 December 2007, and emphasized the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change adopted by the SAARC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change held in Dhaka held on 3 July 2008, wherein specific areas of possible actions by the Member States were identified.

10. The Ministers welcomed the proposal by Bhutan to adopt ‘Climate Change’ as the key theme of the Sixteenth SAARC Summit to be held in Thimphu in April 2010 and also noted the concept paper prepared for the Summit.

11. The Ministers underlined the crucial importance of close cooperation in the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP-15) in Copenhagen, with a view to enabling the full, effective and sustained implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). They also underscored the need to fully implement the commitments under the Convention in accordance with its principles, especially that of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

12. The Ministers also noted the importance of the High Level Conference on Technology Development and Transfer organized by the Government of India in cooperation with UNDESA and expressed hope that this will be an important contribution to the agreed outcomes at Copenhagen.

13. The Ministers recommended that the Member States may undertake cooperation with respect to adaptation, supported with resources as mutually agreed, to address the adverse effects of climate change.

14. In particular, the Ministers underscored the need to undertake and enhance cooperation in areas related to environment amongst the Member States in order to have a coordinated response to climate change. To this end, the Ministers agreed to institutionalize an annual workshop – a South Asia Workshop on Climate Change Actions (SAWCCA). The Ministers welcomed the offer of the Government of India to host the first workshop in early 2010.

(SAARC, 2009).



SAARC, the region and the globe



Concerning the already mentioned growing importance of the environmental issues on the South-Asian agenda and its subsequent extension to international forums one can point to the systemic joint positions taken in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process. In December 2009, Sri Lanka was the representative of a SAARC common position in the COP 15 and it echoed early positions held in the SAARC Summits, in the Environment Ministerial Meetings and also the Statement that the Permanent Representatives of Members States of SAARC, based in New York, launched at the eve of the COP 15 (SAARC, 2010a). In an even more institutionalized and strong position, the SAARC got the right of taking part in the COP 16 as formal observer member, and the Bhuthanese Chair representing the SAARC in the occasion presented the common SAARC position previously written by an Intergovernmental meeting specially aimed at COP 16, which was demanded in the XVI SAARC Summit in Thimphu (2010) (SAARC, 2010a).

Despite the UNFCCC, SAARC has also expanded the role of its environmental approach through other forums and mechanism such as: Its signature of the Memoranda of Understanding with the South Asia Cooperative Environment Programme (SACEP) in July 2004; its link with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), in June 2007, as well as with the collaboration with the United Nations International Strategy on Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) in September 2008 (SAARC, 2010a).

The prominent role played under the umbrella of SAARC at those international forums and organizations were also an outcome of a regional process of increasing attention paid to the specific issue of the Climate Change. Both, recurrent and catastrophic natural disasters affecting South Asian countries as a direct effect of the climate change, and the global wake up for the reality of the alert after the UN Panel for Climate Change was made public, contributed largely to the landmark that was the Dhaka Declaration and the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.

The issue of Climate Change and South-Asian vulnerability



Under one such framework the Fourteenth SAARC Summit (Delhi, 2007) expresses “deep concern” over the climate change and called for “pursuing a climate resilient development in South Asia”. This claim received great consideration at the Twenty-ninth session of the SAARC Council of Ministers, held in Delhi in December of the same year. Evaluating the extension of the impacts caused by recent natural disasters in South Asian countries and recognizing that the causes of such phenomena were not restricted to only national or regional actions they made the claim for reducing the South-Asian countries vulnerability and at the same time to work globally to ensure the reasons behind the Climate Changes themselves. Such demands were soon materialized in a material Plan of Action written in 2008 by the Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change, which was held in Dhaka, following a previous technical meeting – the Expert Group Meeting on Climate Change – which have met at the same place only two days before (July the 1st and the 2nd) (SAARC, 2010a).

Among the main lines of action predicted in the 2008 Plan of Action one must highlight the stress on the necessity of States to promote massive awareness on the already known facts regarding the climate change, which aimed both, the domestic society and the inter-State exchange of knowledge and good practices as well. States were also urged to cooperate in capacity building projects to the extent of CDM and DNA projects, as well as to impose measures against GHG by sinks, among other aspects in line with the Dhaka declaration, which main lines are bellow:



1. Commit ourselves to promote programmes for advocacy and mass awareness raising on climate change and to inculcate habits towards a low carbon society, including incorporation of climate change and related science-based educational material in educational curricula, as per SAARC procedure and practices.

2. Resolve to cooperate on climate change issues for capacity building, including the development of CDM projects and DNA and on incentives for removal of GHG by sinks, and exchange of information of best practices, sharing of the results of research and development for mitigating the effects of climate change and undertaking adaptation measures, and for enhancing south-south cooperation on technology development and transfer, as per established SAARC norms.

3. Agree to initiate and implement programmes and measures as per SAARC practice for adaptation for dealing with the onslaught of climate change to protect the lives and livelihood of our people for food, water and energy securities and call upon Annex-I countries to fulfill their commitments as per UNFCCC for providing additional resources.

4. Further commit ourselves to implement the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.

5. Adopt this Declaration and the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.

(SAARCS, 2008, p. 2)



A big role was also kept for the necessity of developing means of handling individuals affected by climate change outcomes in ways to assure their livelihood, even recalling the individual and collective responsibility of the States assumed before the UNFCCC. This mention to the UNFCCC would be extremely meaningful for its immediate effect of lending the SAARC institutional legitimacy and authority to endorse some aspects of the UNFCCC signed by the South-Asian countries, and also for its further effects of setting the basis for the formal recognition of the SAARC as an observer member in the UNFCCC COP 16 in 2010 (as we have already mentioned before).

In what is seen as an update of the Dhaka document of 2008, the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change 2009-2010 identified seven thematic areas of cooperation, which are: “Finance and investment; education and awareness; management of impacts and risks; and capacity building for international negotiations”. Departing from those acknowledgements the Action Plan lists technical measures and line policies on the following issues: “Capacity building for CDM projects; exchange of information on disaster preparedness and extreme events; exchange of meteorological data; capacity building and exchange of information on climate change impacts (e.g. sea level rise, glacial melting, biodiversity and forestry); and mutual consultation in international negotiation process as the Priority Action Plan” (SAARC, 2010a).

As we have already mentioned, much of the measures taken into a Summit and Ministerial level were not only the reflex of the 'Global Awakening for the risks of Global Warming and other Environmental issues', but also and to a large extent an outcome of the local and regional experiences involving environmental catastrophes. Among those events one should remark the large damages caused by the December 2004 tsunami and the December 2005 earthquake. Just following the tsunami there was a Special Session of the SAARC Environment Ministers in Malé (June, 2005) which adopted the Malé Declaration on Collective Response to Large Scale Natural Disasters (2005) further supplemented by the Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management – which has a mandate lasting until 2015 (SAARC, 2010a).

It's important to note that the effect of the over-exposure of the South-Asian countries to natural disasters not only stimulated the alignment of SAARC and its member countries within the Global efforts to establish best practices on environmental issues, but also lead those countries to use the SAARC as instrument for creating some of the most practical regional institutions to handle such kind of incidences. The just referred Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management is a clear example of this dual role of the reaction-measures of SAARC regarding regional disasters in a sense that it is undeniably global – aligned of the Hyogo Framework and at the roots of the UNFCCC – but also regionally independent since it's giving birth to concrete autonomous and original institutions such as those being confectioned by the SAARC members on their National Plans of Action and the SAARC Disaster Management Center (SDMC).

The SDMC was established in New Delhi in October 2006 and originally provided policy advices and measures to facilitate capacity building including strategic learning, research, training, system development, expertise promotion and exchange of information for effective disaster risk reduction and management. At the XV SAARC Summit (Colombo - 2008) it was suggested that the SDMC should be expanded to include a Natural Disaster Rapid Response Mechanism and, as the Inter-governmental meeting held in May 2011 at the Maldives managed to present a final proposal, it's opening for signature may happen in the XVII Summit scheduled to be held at November this year, also in the Maldives (SAARC, 2010a).



The Thimphu Meeting



With one such background the centring of the official focus of the last SAARC Summit on climate change (XVI Summit) is far less surprising than it could be if simply taken out of context. After all, the regional experience of South-Asia has proven time and again that Environmental policies are a present and meaning reality which has devastated the national capability of many countries – e.g. 60% of the Maldives GDP were lost due to the last tsunami that affected it – and, in light of the still vulnerable social condition of its countries allied with the scenario-prone environment that characterizes the area, it can come to lead to even worst crisis.

This historical reading over the environmental approach of SAARC makes clear how the kind of disasters affecting the region are more linked with the specific theme of Climate Change, for which SAARC and its member countries have historically being key features even in global prominent structures such as the UNFCCC. Accordingly, the 2010 formal commitment on focusing the challenges for best policies regarding climate changes was nothing but a recognition of; the task which was increasingly growing on the previous meetings; the critical moment through which institutions like the Comprehensive Framework on Disaster Management were passing on their way to becoming fully operational; and also, of the great corridor that the issue represented for a SAARC global insertion. After all, it's no mistake that SAARC, as the representative of the acknowledged most affected region by Climate Changes, played a role in the COP 15 and, specially, in the COP 16, which is disproportional to its size in other fields (e.g. economics, military, technology, etc...).

Despite the disputing agendas which always impose theirselves over the official agenda of the SAARC Meeting, and in 2010 had that process intensified by the 'observer' participation of the U.S.A and China, the Thimphu meeting managed to produce a landmark document which updated most previous policies and plans of action, extended some institutional mandates and outlined a number of local and regional important initiatives with the potential of strengthening of the cooperation on climate change related issues. The exert bellow brings the totalitty of the prescriptions adopted in the document (excluding the preamble) – the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change:



(i) Review the implementation of the Dhaka Declaration and SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change and ensure its timely implementation;

(ii) Agree to establish an Inter-governmental Expert Group on Climate Change to develop clear policy direction and guidance for regional cooperation as envisaged in the SAARC Plan of Action on Climate Change;

(iii) Direct the Secretary General to commission a study for presentation to the Seventeenth SAARC Summit on ‘Climate Risks in the Region: ways to comprehensively address the related social, economic and environmental challenges’;

(iv) Undertake advocacy and awareness programs on climate change, among others, to promote the use of green technology and best practices to promote low-carbon sustainable and inclusive development of the region;

(v) Commission a study to explore the feasibility of establishing a SAARC mechanism which would provide capital for projects that promote low-carbon technology and renewable energy; and a Low-carbon Research and Development Institute in South Asian University;

(vi) Incorporate science-based materials in educational curricula to promote better understanding of the science and adverse effects of climate change;

(vii) Plant ten million trees over the next five years (2010-2015) as part of a regional aforestation and reforestation campaign, in accordance with national priorities and programmes of Member States;

(viii) Evolve national plans, and where appropriate regional projects, on protecting and safeguarding the archeological and historical infrastructure of South Asia from the adverse effects of Climate Change;

(ix) Establish institutional linkages among national institutions in the region to, among others, facilitate sharing of knowledge, information and capacity building programmes in climate change related areas;

(x) Commission a SAARC Inter- governmental Marine Initiative to strengthen the understanding of shared oceans and water bodies in the region and the critical roles they play in sustainable living to be supported by the SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center;

(xi) Stress the imperative of conservation of bio-diversity and natural resources and monitoring of mountain ecology covering the mountains in the region;

(xii) Commission a SAARC Inter- governmental Mountain Initiative on mountain ecosystems, particularly glaciers and their contribution to sustainable development and livelihoods to be supported by SAARC Forestry Center;

(xiii) Commission a SAARC Inter-governmental Monsoon Initiative on the evolving pattern of monsoons to assess vulnerability due to climate change to be supported by SAARC Meteorological Research Center;

(SAARC, 2010b).



Besides innovative, those measures come in a context somehow binding, or have the potential to become, for the same Summit Meeting established an Inter-governmental Expert Group on Climate Change (IGEC.CC) in charge of monitoring, reviewing the progress and making recommendations to enable the implementation of the measures contemplated in the Thimphu Statement. Having had its first meeting in June 2011, in Sri Lanka, the IGEC.CC highlighted 13 main points of debate which were widely in accordance with the IPCC (Inter-governamental Panel for Climate Change) as they recognized the biggest environmental risks threatening South-Asia as being those brought by the IPCC in 2007, and stressed the relevance of a Global Action in close assistant to the UNFCCC lines (SAARC, 2011). Worth of saying, their formal declaration included a brief historical framework which agreed on the view of this article regarding the contextual fitting of the 2010 Summit and it's Thimphu Setlement.

Still during the XVI SAARC Summit, a Convention on Cooperation on Environment was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Member States and provided for cooperation in the field of “environment and sustainable development through exchange of best practices and knowledge, capacity building and transfer of eco-friendly technology in a wide range of areas related to the environment” (SAARC, 2010a). The fully implementation of one such Convention, however, still waits the ratification by the signatory states, a process which is been carried out with the support of a Governing Council comprised of Environment Ministers of Member States.

Another achievement of the Thimphu Meeting was the rather symbolic selection of Mr. Appa Sherpa, the twenty time Everest Summiteer as SAARC Goodwill Ambassador for Climate Change until 2012 (SAARC, 2010a). However punctual this fact may seems the fact is that in one such field as Climate Change the issue of perception and spread of knowledge is of utmost importance, therefore, one expects his regional recognition to help launching the awareness of Global Change among grasroots comunities in South-Asia, which, despite being largelly affected by the phenomenos, are still very alienated of the whole process and the current information avaiable on it. Besides, Mr. Appa Sherpa already plays a similar role in the World Food Programme, which makes large propaganda usage of the fact that he was benefitted by the Nepali distribution of food it carrie in the Everest Area.



Conclusion

In a short conclusion one can clearly notice how the SAARC approach walks towards the direction of more binding statements and agreements, what is regionally evident by the several institutions and agreements in the process of ratification, and globally noticed if one looks to the wide usage and reference of international agreements and mechanisms that South-Asian countries belong to, therefore creating some sort of unofficial binding for those countries. Even more important, the framework which settled up the importance of the Climate Change issue to the extent of being the official theme of a SAARC Summit can be understood as a well succeeded attempt of SAARC to hold itself the lines of the environmental policy to be carried out in the region instead of simply neglecting this agenda and enabling external elements to sett up the patters for South-Asia. Even though the SAARC involvement with the issue is clearly being carried out in a collaborative way with international agents and institutions, one must notice that still there's a clear guidance of the SAARC in this whole process and that, as already mentioned, the very external collaboration is being instrumentally taken as a tool for increasing capability and strengthening the binding power of the regional statements on the issue.

As for the predominance of discursive and cognitive achievements in this field one must not credit this to the so called inefficiency of the SAARC, if it in fact exists, but rather, it must be understood that the whole process of securitizing environmental issues is largely dependent on cognitive shifts. Therefore the non-material predominance of the achievements under the umbrella of SAARC should be acknowledged not only in comparison to similar realities being shared by basically all the other countries and regions but, most of all, it must be welcomed for the cognitive step is possibly the most definitive one in the process of definitely setting environmental preservation as a priority in International Relations and in traditional politics as a whole.











BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REPHERENCES



SAARC. Regional Study on the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters and the Protection and Preservation of the Environment. 1991. Avaiable at : <http://www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/Large%20Publications/CCNDPPE/index.php>. 1991.

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______. SAARC Ministerial Statement on Cooperation in Environment (“Delhi Statement”). 2009. Avaiable at: <http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/reports-documents/saarc-ministerial-statement-cooperation-environment-delhi-statement>. 2009.

______. Area of cooperation: Environment. 2010. Avaiable at: <http://www.saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/cat-detail.php?cat_id=54>. 2010a.

______. Thimphu Statement on Climate Change. 2010. Avaiable at: <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.saarc-sec.org%2Fuserfiles%2FThimphuStatementonClimateChange-29April2010.pdf&ei=jOOwTvSTO4_JrQeE9flp&usg=AFQjCNH2Z-V1OnDVntjy8nyIfA8_lA66CA&sig2=L2WwUg-vdqCMWS5qNZf6zw>. 2010b.

______. Statement by Mr. Pema L. Dorji, Director, SAARC Secretariat, on behalf of H.E. Uz. Fathimath Dhiyana Saeed, Secretary General of SAARC, Colombo, 29-30 June 2011. Avaiable at: <http://www.saarc-sec.org/statements/Statement-by-Mr.-Pema-L.-Dorji-Director-SAARC-Secretariat-on-behalf-of-H.E.-Uz.-Fathimath-Dhiyana-Saeed-Secretary-General-of-SAARC-Colombo-29-30-June-2011/8/>. 2011.







CHARACTERIZATION OF SOUTH ASIA (LIBERAL VIEW)

CHARACTERIZATION OF SOUTH ASIA


NOTE: THIS IS A VERY LIBERAL APPROACH, WHICH NEGLECT A SERIES OF REVEALING ASPECTS IN ORDER TO FORGE A SENSE OF CONTINUITY. I DID FOR A LIBERAL COURSE I TOOK BUT I ABSULUTELY DISAGREE WITH MOST THINGS.

  • Members: Bangldesh; India; Pakistan; Nepal; Sri Lanka; Maldives (but Dushyantha Mendis does not consider it)


  • Patterns of Analysis: Historical Background; Social Pluralism; Control of Resources; Psychological Security;


  • Bangladesh, India and Pakistan share a similar historical background with antecedence in the Moghul and British empire.

    • Moghul political and social system was 'agrarean bureaucracy' on top of heterogeneous collection of native chieftains differing widely in resources and power.

    • Native chieftains with substantial independence, with moderate incorporation in the Moghul bureaucratic system.

    • Small economic surpluss left with native populations worked to avoid internal dissentions.


    • British rule made few modifications only, but despite the monolitic fashion of unity there was much decentralization (more than 500 petty rulers).

    • Zamindari feudal and exploitative system.

    • By the end of the 19th Century a local industrial class at odds with the British concurrence succeed on managing the rural masses (with great help of Gandhi) to achieve independence.

      • Gandhi's swadeshi (buy local) was basically favorable to the domestic industries


    • BANGLADESH

      • Was the State of Esst Bengal during colonial times, than become East Pakistan after partition and just with the independence, in 1971, become Bangladesh.

      • After partition most Hindus fled away, what alleviated the feudal land control, but also impoverished the industrial capacity.

      • The Ayub (of Hindu majority) regime was substituted after partition by the Awami League, which kept landownership ceiling and other measures protecting the amorphous petty bourgeoisie with large doses of patronage.

      • 1972 expansion of the public sector (nationalization).

        • 86% of the industries belonged to the state.

      • Inpetitude, famine, authoritarian tendencies and Mujib's attempt to set up a one-party socialist state led to the military coup of 1975.

        • Regime change did not make a difference in the locus of power.

        • Economic liberalization that followed didn't led to any democratization trend.

          • Privatized over 600 public enterprises in the last 15 years (more than Chile under Pinochet).

            • Around 60% of those enterprises were closed.


    • INDIA

      • The independence and post-independence period is characterized as a political oligarchy, also known as 'Nehruvian Order'.

      • Different groups playing different roles in the different political levels.

      • Elites enlarged their dominance through controlling the state led development.

        • Until the liberalization, in the 1990's, India owed 60% of the productive capital in the industrial sector; Run 8 of the top 10 industries; employed 2/3 of the regulated workers; owed more than 25 % of capital stocks and regulated patterns of private investment.

        • Traditional elites encompassed industrial capitalists, rich farmers and professional bureaucrats.

          • Secondary beneficiary are parasitic large burgeoisie and middle classes, like the Jana Sangh, threatened from above by the state intervention and from bellow by the backard classe mobilization.

          • BJP expanded its bases to the urban middle world (1980's and 1990's), latter extending to upper cast discontents with Mandal Comission.

      • OBC's, Dalits and Scheduled Casts, after a long history in South India and Maharashtra, come to increase the participation of the poor in the electoral process.

        • In 1972 only 38% of the poor voted, but in 1996, 51% of the poor voted.

        • 42% of the lower castes in 1972 felt their vote made any difference, while this increased to 60% in 1996.

        • Rates of party membership of Scheduled Castes increased from 13% in 1971 to 19% in 1996, and the upper casts declined from 36% to 28% during the same period.

      • The increasing role of regional identities and the reestructuring of Indian politics also come as a central leadership attempt to undercut the power of local elites (e.g. Indira Gnadhi Congress Party 'seizure').

        • Decline of national parties and trend to even larger coalition governments being formed between the national and regional parties.

          • India's 2 largest national parties (Congress and BJP) only had 52% of votes in 1992.

        • Mendis sees a positive tendency in this, which would reflect the diversity of the country and make India more federal.

      • Liberalization started by Narashima Rao in 1991 was impelled by a balance of payment crisis, but continued not only in the central level but also driven by the federative units themselves.

      • Mendis sees the current scenario as the end of Nehruvian Order and points to the growing role of the Election Comission and Supreme Court as democratic achievements.

        • Points Ujjwal Kumar Singh's view that the Supreme Court helped to empower the Election Commission, which accordingly would be a model to the whole South Asia.


    • PAKISTAN

      • Military has always played a determinant role in Pakistani history, backed by civil bureaucracy and also as outcome of external factors like India.

      • Muslim League, civil bureaucracy and military in Pakistan were a shadow of their counterparts in India.

      • Infrastructural inadequacies aligned with the Kashmir War strengthened the power of militarily.

      • Main Constitutional impasses were: Islamic or secular state; the question of national language; koint or separate electorates (regarding religious minorities); the issue of representation and the Bengali majority.

        • It's no wonder that it took two Constituent Assemblies until 1956 to draft a Constitution, or that this Constitution could never be made operational because the military seized direct control in 1958.

        • Until them there was only a facade of civilian control with real military influence.

          • Elections were scheduled to 1959.

      • Muslim League – architects of independence – were based in India, but the ruling class after independence were the Mohajirs (migratory minority industrial class).

        • Coming from Bombay and Calcutta the Mohajirs, along with the Punjabi Chiniotis, assumed the entrepreneurial leadership since the Pakistani Muslim bourgeoisie didn't do it.

      • In 1970 the populist Pakistan People's Party won the elections (Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) and promoted some nationalizations

        • Split of Bangladesh.

        • Industrial elites smashed up by but re-emerged through the Green Revolution and as shop keepers and small scale industrialists.

          • In any case, the Military has never weakened its control over power in Pakistan.

            • Military occupied a large fraction of the civil positions in that country.

            • Even the political parties are not insulated from the army.


  • Nepal Historical Background

    • Politically unified in 1978 by upper caste Hindus fleeing from Muslim dominated India.

      • Even before the Ranas they were good on absorving local power also.

    • In mid 19th Century the Ranas started controlling the king and imposed a hereditary prime-ministership until 1950.

    • Indian Nationalism fostered Nepali nationalism and in 1950 the Nepali Congress (B.P. Koirala and D.R. Regmi) overthrew the Rana rule.

    • Main players in the 1950 political struggle:

      • Monarchy, which was freed from the Rana control in 1950 and kept an assertive role until the 2005-6 upheaval.

      • The traditional elites, mostly based in Kathmandu, which kept organized under the pre-1951 chakari patron client family system, however with less cohesiveness and sense of identity than during the Rana rule, but still exerting a key role while dominating the main parties independently of their ideology.

      • Political parties, which Mendis points to be self-fulfilling-aimed and dependent on the Monarchy and on the traditional elites.

    • The Rana hereditary Prime-Ministership was substituted by a non-hereditary Parliamentary Monarchy in which the Ranas would influence only the King (Tribhuvan 1911 – 1955 and Mahendra 1955 – 1972).

    • In 1959, however, King Mahendra imposes Panchayat system according to which Parliament could not be disputed by candidates with parties.

      • It started working effectively in 1962.

      • The Constitution for that would be written in 1960.

    • In 1989 the People's Movement would force the King Birendra (son of Mahendra) to accept constitutional reforms returning to the multipartidary Parliamentary Monarchy.

      • The new Constitution would be finished in 1991.

    • In 1996 the Maoist start a Civil War against the King and in favour of a secular socialist people's democracy folding the tribal and minority claims also.

    • In 2001 the Prince Dipendra killed the King, the Queen and other 5 cousins, and, as he committed suicide, his brother, Gyanendra, took the crown.

    • In 2005 Gyanendra dissolved the Parliament under the claim of centralization to resist the Maoists.

    • In 2006 Gyanendra was weak and agreed on transfering sovereignty to the people, bringing back the Parliament which was unanimous in ending his Royal powers, abolishing monarchy and instituting a secular state.

      • In 2007, the formal modifications to vanish monarchism went on the Parliament to reform the Constitution.

      • In 2008 those arrangements were made as the Constitutional Assembly was called to write a new Constitution.

        • In this same year the Maoist leader Prachandra was elected Prime Minister but couldn't keep the coalition, loosing power in 2009 without concluding the Constitutional writing, which still today is unfinished for nobody could keep enough stability as Prime Minister.



  • Sri Lanka Historical Background

    • After the great hydraulic civilization (13th Century) Sri Lanka was ruled by a bureaucratic monarchy until the Europian conqueering in the 16th and 17th Centuries.

      • Portuguese and Dutch conquer of the litoral and British conquer of the central hills (1815 Kandyan aristocracy overthrew the ruling king and invited the British).

    • Kandyan – British rule (1815 - 1832) based on aristocratic families, agricultural based, caste-system, centralized administration, corruption and unrestricted power.

    • 1832 Legislative and Executive Council

    • Elitist and clientelist nationalism slowly emerged and in 1933 the British grant universal adult franchise against Sri Lankan political elite.

    • Independence (1948) was lead by a petit bourgeoisie – Intermediate Regimes (Michael Kalecki).

      • Represented by S.W.E.D. Bandaranaike election as Prime-Minister in 1956.

        • Hight degree of state control over the economy

        • Creation of a large public sector to the petit bourgeoisie

        • Protection to the domestic entrepreneurial class.

          • Any of this means the poor were taken care.

    • This intermediate regime harmonized the 2 biggest countries until 1977, but than economic stagnation made the claim for changes.

      • Since 1971 there was an armed revolt of the 'declasses'

    • In 1877 J.R. Jayewardene resorted to open economy.

      • This has been the consensus among the 2 biggest parties.


Saturday, 1 October 2011

O CORPO E A ALMA DA ÍNDIA: O VEREDITO DE AYODHYA E O NOVO JAMN DO COMUNALISMO INDIANO

O CORPO E A ALMA DA ÍNDIA: O VEREDITO DE AYODHYA E O NOVO JAMN DO COMUNALISMO INDIANO


Introdução


Na tarde do dia 30 de setembro de 2010, a Corte de Allahabad (Hight Court of Allahabad) finalmente divulgou seu veredito sobre o direito de posse da área historicamente proclamada sagrada por Hinduístas e Muçulmanos, na cidade de Ayodhya, região de Uttar Pradesh. Marco na história do Comunalismo indiano, o julgamento foi anunciado após sete dias de adiamento consecutivos e decidiu em favor da tripartição da área entre duas facções Hindus e uma Muçulmana. Mais relevante, contudo, vem sendo o fato de que, até o momento, não houve relatos de atos violentos como os que mancharam de sangue a Índia em 1992 e 2002.


Histórico do caso

Em 1528 o primeiro Imperador Mughal a reinar sobre o território que hoje constitui a Índia, Imperador Babur (ou Babar), construiu a imensa Mesquita de Babri Masjid, numa área em que, posteriormente, membros da comunidade Hinduísta alegariam ter sido o local de nascimento de sua divindade “Lord Rama” (Lord Ram), há mais de 2500 anos atrás.

Por cerca de três séculos o status quo da região não sofreu contestações sensíveis, contudo, após dois séculos de colonização inglesa o poder Mughal já estava praticamente contido ao papel simbólico de principados espalhados pelo país – British Raj – e, por conseqüência, surgiu espaço para a contestação de várias instituições herdadas deste período. Neste cenário, a demanda pela construção de um templo para Lord Ram foi tornando contornos mais concretos entre 1840 e 1949, quando os constantes protestos levaram o governo local a declarar esta uma região contestada e, para evitar confrontos, proibir o acesso à área.

Por trás do recrudescimento que marcou os protestos de 1940 estava o debate sobre uma independência que já se encaminhava para acontecer e, portanto, inseria a sociedade numa discussão sobre o formato do país a ser construído. Dentre as diversas correntes de idéias que marcaram esse período, as demandas sobre a área de Babri Masjid foram um reflexo imediato do Ram-rajyia, um modelo social descrito nos textos Hinduístas que Mohandas Ghandi popularizou e que, conforme Hardgrave e Kochanek definem, seria um esforço pela restauração do reino ideal dos tempos de Lord Rama.

Após a independência, em 1948, o ideal hindu-nacionalista, apropriando-se da ideia do Ram-rajyia, assim como diversos outros projetos nacionais-religiosos, vindos de Sikhs, Muçulmanos, Budistas e outras religiões expressivas no sub-continente Indiano, foram juridicamente contidas por uma constituição federativa e secular. No campo político, essas tendências foram freadas por aproximadamente 30 anos de dominação política do secular “Partido Congresso” (atualmente Indian National Congress), cerca de 20 dos quais foram obtidos por um sagaz jogo político (período da Hegemonia do Partido Congresso), e os demais ficaram a cargo da centralização de poderes exercida pela Primeira Ministra Indira Gandhi (período da Imposição do Partido Congresso).

Com o ruir da hegemonia do Partido Congresso e aproveitando-se dos ressentimentos locais gerados pela centralização imposta por Indira Gandhi, as idéias de nacionalismo-religioso recobraram força, sobretudo entre a maioria Hindu (cerca de 80% da população). Um reflexo imediato foi a ascensão de organizações e partidos hindu-nacionalistas que levaram a ideia do Ram-rajyia aos extremos do que muitos consideram um fascismo-hinduísta. Neste contexto, a organização hinduísta-nacionalista RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), à qual pertencia o assassino de Mohandas Gandhi (Mahatma Gandhi), conseguiu dar proeminência nacional aos seus braços políticos: O Jana Sangh, existente desde 1951, que a partir de 1980 se desmembrou dando origem ao BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party); o VHP (Vishua Hindu Parishad), ainda mais extremista, fundado em 1964; dentre outros.

Além da esfera política tradicional, houve uma efusão de nacionalismo-hinduísta por parte de importantes setores sociais, os quais firmaram vínculos com a RSS. A televisão estatal, Doordashan, exibiu um seriado de 18 meses sobre o épico Ramayana, seguido por 91 semanas de exibição do Mahabharat. Ambos textos hinduístas que, conforme Arvind Rajagopal, foram filmados e exibidos como forma de propaganda do Ram-rajyia.

Respaldados pela transformação política após a morte de Indira Gandhi e a diminuição do poder do Partido Congresso, em 1984 o VHP tomou as demandas sobre a área de Babri Masjid como ponto chave de sua agenda e iniciou um movimento forte e institucionalizado para liberação do local em contestação para que se construísse o templo de Ramjanmabhoomi, em adoração à divindade Hinduísta Lord Rama.

Em 1986, sem autorizar a demolição de Babri Masjid, uma decisão do tribunal distrital definiu que os portões seriam reabertos para a peregrinação exclusiva de Hinduístas. Por trás desta decisão estava a denúncia de que, dentro da Mesquita, haveria algumas estátuas e ídolos Hindus, cujos Sunitas que reivindicam a área, porém, alegam terem sido colocadas após o trancamento dos portões em 1949, supostamente forjando as bases para a vitória judicial conquistada pelos Hinduístas.

Em repúdio, o Comitê de Ação Babri Masjid (Babri Masjid Action Comitee) articulou uma onda de protestos nacionais contra o impedimento de Muçulmanos entrarem no templo, o que culminou numa carreata de mais de 300.000 pessoas rumo a Nova Déli, em março de 1987. Um mês após, o VHP organizou uma contra-marcha, que mobilizou milhares de Hinduístas rumo a Nova Deli.

Às vésperas das eleições de 1989 e tendo experimentado um crescimento acelerado em função do envolvimento com a questão de Babri Masjid / Ramjanmabhoomi, o VHP resolveu ir mais além e, em 1989, lançou um movimento para demolir a Mesquita e, no lugar, construir seu templo Hinduísta. Na primeira de uma série de ações que gerariam ondas de violência, houve uma convocação nacional para que Hinduístas de todo o país se dirigissem a Ayodhya com um tijolo para “construir seu templo”. A despeito das medidas precatórias do governo central, a iniciativa gerou milhares de mortes. Cidades como Bhagalpur, na região de Bihar, tiveram entre 200 e 1000 casos de assassinatos em função da campanha do VHP, marcando este como o período, até então, mais violento do Comunalismo desde a independência.

Com as mesmas motivações políticas, o BJP também incorporou a demanda Hinduísta à sua agenda e, num gesto extremado, seu presidente, L. K. Advani, anunciou uma peregrinação de carruagem por 10.000 km que cruzaria o país e terminaria em Ayodhyia. Sua carruagem enfeitada com atributos Hinduístas anunciava chegar em Ayodhyia em 30 de outubro de 1990, seguida por uma multidão que ilegal e unilateralmente destruiria Babri Masjid e construiria Ramjanmabhoomi. Se adiantando às previsíveis conseqüências catastróficas deste ato, o governo central prendeu Advani e outros líderes do BJP no dia 23 de outubro, quando a multidão que o seguia já se aproximava da região de Uttar Pradesh. Como conseqüência houve um prolongado confronto entre manifestantes e polícias, bem como a emergência de violência entre Muçulmanos e Hinduístas, levando á morte de mais de 300 pessoas.

Politicamente a situação gerou uma instabilidade que, em função da oposição dos partidos ligados à RSS, levou à queda do Primeiro Ministro V. P. Singh, que se afastou após o Parlamento votar um “Voto de Não-confiança” (Vote of No Confidence).

Após as complicadas eleições de 1991 o BJP e o VHP declararam que, em dezembro de 1992, iriam construir o Ramjanmabhoomi no local em que estava a Mesquita. Intimidado pela queda de seu sucessor, o Primeiro Ministro Narasima Rao contentou-se com a evasiva promessa de que BJP e VHP não infringiriam o recente veredito que declarava a área como zona de contestação e proibia a entrada de ambos os contestantes.

Em dezembro de 1992 a força tarefa designada para proteger Babri Majid foi de reduzidos 15.000 “paramilitaries” (uma força policial intermediária entre a polícia tradicional e o exército que, a despeito do nome, é 100% constitucional e não possui relação com as associações criminosas às quais a Língua Portuguesa geralmente se refere por este nome). Quando a multidão de 200.000 militantes Hinduístas começou a invadir e depredar a Mesquita o efetivo policial nem mesmo esboçou resistência e, em poucas horas, a enorme construção de 500 anos fora reduzida a escombros. Nos seis dias seguintes houve uma onda de violência e choques entre manifestantes e policiais que levou à morte de 1200 pessoas, majoritariamente Muçulmanos.

Apesar dos faniquitos do Primeiro Ministro se dizendo traído pela nação, o fato é que a postura permissiva do Estado gerou uma crise nacional e internacional. O presidente dissolveu o Parlamento e declarou “President’s Rule”, uma espécie de estado de emergência que garante ao Presidente poderes supra-constitucionais, centraliza os poderes e restringe liberdades individuais, direitos civis e políticos. O Chief Minister de Uttar Pradesh, algo como o “Primeiro Ministro” em nível regional, pediu afastamento do cargo. A RSS, o VHP e as reminiscência do Barjrang Dal, bem como duas organizações extremistas islâmicas, o Jamaat-i-Islam e o Islamic Sevak Sangh, foram colocadas na ilegalidade por dois anos.

Internacionalmente o fato levou a um recrudescimento com o Paquistão e, em menor escala, Bangladesh, além de uma severa condenação emitida pelas 56 Estados da Conferência Islâmica e pela Arábia Saudita.

Guardada na memória popular e incitada por lideranças políticas, a herança de ódio e medo envolvendo esta contenda retomou seu lugar na história indiana no ano de 2002, quando um grupo de rebeldes muçulmanos ateou fogo em um trem que passara pela cidade de Godhra, região de Guajará, com peregrinos Hinduístas que retornavam de Ayodhia, em 27 de janeiro daquele ano. Tendo recebido vasta cobertura da mídia, este ataque, o primeiro televisionado na história da Índia, suscitou uma série de violações contra Muçulmanos, as quais se articularam com o apoio de importantes partidos e organizações sociais associados ao ideal hinduísta-nacionalista. Por mais de três dias houve uma completa derrocada da lei e da ordem, a qual só foi re-estabelecida com uma nova intervenção federal.

Desde então a articulação entre governos nacionais e locais evidenciou um relativo sucesso em isolar a área contestada enquanto, a partir de 2004, tramitava um novo julgamento do caso, agora pela Hight Court de Allahabad. Neste processo o veredito teria de esclarecer os direitos de posse sobre a região e, presumivelmente, lançar as diretrizes do futuro desta área. Num clima tenso, ambientado pelo medo histórico herdade de 1992 e 2002, além de outros agravantes, o veredito foi anunciado para o dia 23 de setembro de 2010, tendo sido sete vezes postergado diariamente e, finalmente, anunciando, no dia 30 de setembro, a tripartição da área entre 2 grupos Hinduístas e 1 Muçulmano (Sunita).

Comunalismo na Índia


Antes de analisarmos os efeitos imediatos deste caso sobre a política e sociedade indiana é necessário compreendermos o contexto que possibilitou a um litígio de propriedade abalar a ordem nacional por duas vezes, bem como os motivos pelos quais este último veredito trouxe tanta preocupação e medo.

Mais do que uma disputa por um terreno, o litígio de Babri Masjid / Ramjanmabhoomi é a expressão de uma organização social / ideologia que busca promover os interesses de parcelas da população presumivelmente em detrimento de outra, ou outras, ou mesmo da sociedade como um todo, usando a religião como instrumento de manipulação social. A este processo, marcado nos interstícios da sociedade e da política indiana, chama-se Comunalismo (Communalism). O Comunalismo é, portanto, a criação de identidades políticas baseadas em identidades religiosas que são manipuladas por meio do dogmatismo extremado, o qual, por conseqüência, estende à política o antagonismo inconciliável de interesses entre duas ou mais comunidades religiosas.

Por estas razões e em face das expressões práticas do Comunalismo, associadas a levantes semelhantes ao de Babri Masjid e mesmo a algumas causas do separatismo Paquistanês, o primeiro Primeiro Ministro Indiano, Jawahar lal Nehru, peça chave na conquista da independência e um dos principais nomes da democracia indiana em seus primórdios, afirmou que a maior ameaça à Índia não seria nenhuma ameaça externa, mas sim a instituição do Comunalismo.

O Comunalismo prevê a existência unitária de uma ou outra comunidade religiosa, sobre a qual reside o universo das ações e ambições dos atores políticos. Dessa forma, o ethos Comunalista se foca em categorias religiosas específicas toda a sua atenção, e ambiciona direcionar também a totalidade da política nacional para este palco em que a religião, e não a nação ou o Estado, emerge como fruto de uma aceitação religiosa que se sobrepõe ao contrato social.

No caso particular da Índia, o Comunalismo é um claro atentado aos esforços nacionalistas que se pautam pelos valores da multietnicidade, multireligiosidade e das diversas comunidades lingüísticas. Contrariamente à proposta constitucional de enfrentar a pluralidade interna por meio da agregação e do envolvimento, o Comunalismo aponta no sentido da rivalização e da imposição.

Apesar de seus vínculos com a religião, porém, o Comunalismo não pode ser diagnosticado como uma conseqüência direta da religiosidade ou mesmo da co-existência de distintos valores. Prova disso é o fato de que o Comunalismo é um fenômeno estritamente moderno que, por exemplo, não se observa no passado medieval indiano – Ayuveda –, ou mesmo durante o auge do Império Moghul. Com suas raízes cravadas na política colonial britânica de fomento dos ódios internos e balcanização do cenário colonial, esta forma particular de se internalizar os extremismos religiosos na política deve ser interpretada como uma resposta sectária, restritiva e juridicamente negativa ao processo de modernização e construção do Estado-Nação-Moderno na Índia do Raj Britânico em diante.

Assim como não há dúvida de que as instituições do Comunalismo foram forjadas sob a tutela da Companhia das Índias, pode-se dizer que o combustível que alimenta esse câncer foi também trazido pelas caravelas britânicas. Num discurso histórico sobre Comunalismo, Jawahar lal Nehru descreveu o Comunalismo como a versão indiana do fascismo. De acordo com ele, o Comunalismo estaria cravado no seio das minorias em função do medo, enquanto seu berço entre as maiorias seria a reação política. Se a reação política das maiorias é um reflexo das características geopolíticas da Índia, com uma formação demográfica absurdamente desigual, a fonte do medo no outro extremo deste ciclo foi uma conseqüência direta do “Holocausto Comunal” induzido pela metrópole britânica. Mais valioso que descobrir qual destes elementos surgiu primeiro é, portanto, notar que, ao menos um deles foi criado pelos colonizadores, trazendo uma variável que, propositiva ou reativa, invariavelmente mudou a percepção social sobre as possibilidades de convivência multireligiosa.

Por esses fatores, muitos analistas pontuam que a ascensão do Comunalismo a partir do Raj Britânico foi menos uma conseqüência da religiosidade e da cultura do que da presença de forças não-religiosas e não-culturais operando nos sistemas políticos e econômicos que se construíam. Moin Shakir aponta que as principais organizações políticas a emergirem com a independência mantêm as massas ignorantes das realidades e demandas / oportunidades da era moderna.

Como evidência deste fato podemos tomar, por exemplo, a separação do Paquistão como um evento que vai muito além da perda territorial e, na verdade, sacramenta as bases do Comunalismo entre Muçulmanos e Hinduístas, que em função deste evento solidificaram o seus sentimentos de “medo” e “reação” no corpo de intolerantes partidos políticos.

Outra expressão do Comunalismo pode ser observada na indústria cultural e midiática que sofre uma visível interferência do Comunalismo. Alguns jornais de grande circulação, como o Akali Patrika, o Sabat e o Organizer funcionam como filtros à informação política não relacionada ao Comunalismo. Mesmo a historiografia nacional é motivo de contenda, sendo estritamente dividida e exageradamente tendenciosa, como se observa no caso dos historiadores Muçulmanos, Allaudin Khiji, Mahmud Ghanznavi, Auranzeb, dentre outros.

Politicamente a força de partidos declaradamente Comunalistas, como o Hindu Mahasabha (Hinduista), Muslim League (Muçulmano) e o Akali Dal (Sikh), dentre outros, dão uma noção de como a realidade de Ayodhyia é apenas um esboço do quadro geral observado na Índia.

Um último elemento importante a ser destacado sobre o Comunalismo indiano diz respeito à expressão econômica desse fenômeno. Funcionando como variável interveniente, a economia tanto ajuda a compreender os desníveis entre diferentes grupos, quanto demonstra as formas como esta estrutura trabalha para se imortalizar na realidade indiana. No caso do Comunalismo entre Hinduístas e Muçulmanos, no qual se insere o Veredito de Ayodhyia, observa-se que ao longo da colonização britânica houve um acesso desigual entre Hinduístas e Muçulmanos ao modelo educacional moderno. Conquanto haja um intenso debate sobre a intencionalidade deste acesso desigual ou a mera refuta dos Muçulmanos a abandonarem suas instituições, assentadas no status quo do Império Moghul, o fato é que no imediato pós-independência houve uma clara inadequação da instrução Muçulmana com a estrutura moderna que deu forma ao Estado Indiano. Por conseguinte, verificou-se uma inferioridade na qualidade de vida de Muçulmanos que potencializou o elemento de medo da dinâmica Comunalista. Em decorrência deste fato, portanto, muitos analistas pontuam que os eventos de 1992 foram o reflexo social de uma desigualdade econômica que vem sendo corrigida pelo governo desde a independência.

As expectativas para o veredito


A partir da ótica econômica, citada acima, as expectativas para o Veredito de 2010 eram otimistas e apontavam, mais do que na direção de uma positivação jurídica da questão, na direção de uma sociedade mais madura e capaz de aceitar a prevalência dos valores nacionais sobre ranços Comunalistas. Para muitos analistas o anúncio do veredito de 2010 seria menos importante por seu conteúdo e mais relevante pela forma como a sociedade reagiria a ele. Simplificadamente, uma reação não violenta seria a expressão de relativo sucesso das políticas de inclusão social que buscam reduzir os desníveis econômicos e políticos entre os diferentes setores sociais. Na mesma interpretação, um cenário pacífico também demonstraria o crescimento de importância das instituições jurídicas junto à sociedade indiana.

A despeito destas expectativas, porém, o anúncio do veredito sucedeu um clima extremamente tenso que envolveu a sociedade Indiana. Acima de tudo houve um medo generalizado por parte da população. As páginas de jornais do dia 30 de setembro estampavam fotos de ruas vazias em locais que geralmente são hiper-movimentados. A maioria das escolas e estabelecimentos públicos não funcionou no dia 29 e boa parte dos estabelecimentos privados encerraram seu expediente às 14:00 horas, pois esperava-se um anúncio a partir das 15:00.

Há dias os jornais vinham estampando pedidos da Presidente e do Primeiro Ministro clamando por paz. Em Nova Deli no início da semana houve uma imensa passeata fazendo vigília noturna para conscientizar a população da necessidade de receber o anúncio do julgamento de forma pacífica. As televisões que, atendendo a um “pedido mais do que especial” feito diretamente pelo Primeiro Ministro, evitaram polarizar o clima antes do anúncio e subitamente perderam seus sinais na hora estabelecida para a transmissão, só recobrando sua programação horas depois. Neste intervalo a população indiana assistia atenta e temerosa a mensagens de paz e unidade nacional televisionadas pelo sistema de emergência nacional. Sistema este que, aliás, anunciou recentemente ter preparado uma série de exibições que seriam colocados no ar caso houvesse algum problema mais grave.

Tão logo as TV’s recobraram seus sinais o Primeiro Ministro, Manmohan Singh, foi ao ar duas vezes numa mesma noite pedindo paz e exortando a população a colocar o respeito pelas instituições democráticas nacionais acima de qualquer outro sentimento.

Na manhã do dia 30 os principais pontos turísticos tiveram abundantes reforços policiais. Ayodhyia foi tomada por praticamente todos os oficiais de campo da polícia provincial – Provincial Armed Constambulary (PAC) –, em adição às 20 Companhias da força intermediária entre exército e polícia – Central Paramilitary Forces (CPF). Ao longo de todo o país as forças militares e policiais que não estavam na rua ficaram nos quartéis de prontidão, enquanto a Força Aérea estava preparada para uma mobilização de emergência.

Como se não fosse o bastante, todo esse cenário se prolongou por sete dias além do prazo inicialmente anunciado para divulgação do veredito. Sem dar muita explicação, o Conselho Especial, composto por três juízes, simplesmente postergou o anúncio por sete vezes seguidas. Muitos acreditam, ou acreditaram à época, que tratava-se de uma manobra para ganhar tempo e só anunciar a decisão após os Commonwealth Games. Coincidência ou não, o fato é que Deli estava lotada de turistas e delegações esportivas que vieram para a realização dos Commonweath Games, ocorrendo no intercurso de duas semanas. Se as medidas para impressionar os visitantes chegaram ao extremo de proibir o trânsito de cidadãos em determinadas rodovias, parar a atividade de colégios e burocracias públicas e até mesmo o absurdo cobrir as diversas favelas da cidade com imensos pôsteres de boas-vindas, então talvez essa de fato tenha sido uma das explicações para a demora.

Anunciado o veredito, contudo, houve uma compreensão de que este tempo talvez tivesse sido necessário para se organizar o palco de guerra que se armou como precaução a uma reação violenta por parte de setores da sociedade. Da parte dos juízes, porém, nega-se qualquer motivação política para o atraso que, supostamente, foi necessário para concluir alguns detalhes.


O veredito


Sobre as causas políticas do atraso, pode-se fazer pouco mais do que especular. O veredito, contudo, foi uma prova inegável do comprometimento político do julgamento. Em suas 8189 páginas estabeleceu-se que os 2,77 acres em disputa serão repartidos entre duas facções Hinduístas e o conselho Sunita que comandava a Mesquita até 1992, sendo que a área propriamente em disputa, ou seja, o local onde originalmente ficava o edifício, ficará sob domínio Hinduísta.

Baseando a decisão na consideração de que “o local de nascimento é a pessoa jurídica de uma divindade” a Corte acolheu o parecer do Archeological Survey of India (ASI) atestando que no século 12 D.C o local servira de templo para Lord Ram, supostamente nascido lá.

A historiadora Romila Thapar, especialista em História Antiga da Índia, pontua que os argumentos históricos aventados no veredito são absolutamente inconsistentes para se contraporem a um templo que existiu pelos últimos 500 anos até ser destruído por levas que ainda estão impunes. Segundo ela o relatório do ASI é extremamente enviesado, estando sob contestação por parte de diversos arqueólogos. Ademais, ela lembra que, de maneira geral, qualquer evidência arqueológica é insuficiente para servir de carro chefe a um veredito jurídico, pois as divergências sempre existem.

Também se deve notar que o argumento jurídico favorável à construção do templo Hinduísta se esquece totalmente de mencionar os vínculos entre a destruição criminosa de Babri Masjid há 18 anos e os demandantes Hinduístas no processo. Curioso como um contestado parecer arqueológico sobre a existência de um edifício no século 12 D.C. afeta a legitimidade dos Muçulmanos que construíram sua Mesquita há 500 anos, enquanto os direitos Hinduístas não foram sequer arranhados pelo ato criminoso recentemente cometido.

Nitidamente, o que se buscou com esse veredito foi não suscitar uma nova onda de protestos violentos. Qualquer decisão favorável aos Muçulmanos colocaria a ordem social na corda bamba das maiorias Hindus e suas lideranças fascistas. Uma decisão inteiramente favorável aos Hinduístas, por sua vez, explicitaria de vez a inviabilidade do secularismo constitucional diante de um cenário político social dominado pelo Comunalismo hinduísta. Assim escolheu-se a opção de agradar o mais forte e oferecer um consolo ao outro, o que, se não gerou satisfação, pelo menos evitou um possível derramamento de sangue.

Sem entrar no mérito dessa análise política, o fato é que uma decisão nestes termos atenta contra o princípio da separação dos poderes e fere a autonomia do legislativo. Ademais, o reconhecimento de que “o local de nascimento é uma pessoa jurídica e uma divindade” abre um precedente que pode levar ao descaminho do sistema jurídico secular rumo a uma lei Hinduísta ou, pelo menos, influenciável por dogmas religiosos. Ao colocar em mais alta estima o direito de propriedade em função de um mito religioso do que as indiscutíveis evidências concretas da propriedade Muçulmana sobre o terreno nos últimos anos, a Corte abre um precedente para que novos direitos de propriedade sejam questionados com base em mitos religiosos. Desta forma não é insensato pensarmos que, por exemplo, uma propriedade legalmente constituída possa vir a ser expropriada em função alegações do valor religioso do bem para um determinado grupo de crentes.

Esta prerrogativa fere o secularismo constitucional de forma ainda mais intensa dadas as especificidades do caso Indiano, em que a predominância política da maioria Hinduísta soma-se ao imenso e variável número de divindades desta fé. Com mais de 44.000.000 mil divindades o Hinduísmo pode servir de pano de fundo para contestações de diversas propriedades sem esgotar seu arcabouço imagético. Numa situação hipotética e exagerada, o Hinduísmo bem poderia contestar, por exemplo, a propriedade de uma casa privada alegando ser um local sagrado do ‘Deus A’ e, ainda assim, ter um alfabeto inteiro de Deuses para eventualmente contestar outras casas. Obviamente que o exemplo dado foi grosseiro e exagerado, contudo, a própria história indiana mostra que, num grau menos visível envolvendo litígios menos importantes, embora não menos nocivos, esta é uma prática existente. Resta agora o temor de que o veredito de Ayodhyia estimule ainda mais casos como este. Se os absurdos clamores da RSS alegando que “todas as mesquitas na Índia foram construídas sobre templos Hinduístas” já eram preocupantes antes, agora resta ver como o sistema jurídico indiano vai impedir que a brecha de Babri Masjid se alargue ainda mais


As conseqüências imediatas


Uma conseqüência imediata, que vem sendo considerada o maior mérito do veredito, foi a manutenção da paz e da ordem. Os principais meio de notícia não mencionaram se quer um caso de violência Comunalista associada ao julgamento. As declarações por parte das principais lideranças políticas mantiveram um tom comedido e, ainda que críticos, sempre resilientes e enfatizando a prioridade de se manter a unidade nacional.

Contudo, essa ordem após o julgamento tem um que de abstrata, pois, a bem da verdade, o julgamento já era contestado antes mesmo de ser emitido. Tendo ainda como recorrer à Suprema Corte, ambas as partes já enfatizavam que qualquer decisão que não lhes agradece seria contestada no foro máximo do sistema judiciário indiano. Ademais, ainda é cedo para avaliar a resiliência das partes, afinal, o destrancamento dos portões e a construção de um templo Hindu ainda devem aguardar um demorado processo burocrático possivelmente a depender de voto favorável da Suprema Corte.

Na conflagração de um novo cenário de medo, ambas as partes demonstram-se insatisfeitas com o julgamento atual, o que se expressa pelo fato de que os encaminhamentos à Suprema Corte foram feitos tanto por Muçulmanos quanto por Hinduístas que, afinal, não desejam partir nenhuma porção da área contestada.

Ademais, Hinduístas radicais ligados ao RSS e mesmo representantes da parte Hinduísta no processo já falam da construção do templo como se esta fosse uma certeza, chagando mesmo a preparar canteiros de obra nos limites da propriedade e a exortar os Muçulmanos a abdicarem seu direito sobre parte da propriedade. Estas exortações, a propósito, vêm sendo feitas num tom quase ameaçador, sobretudo quando as partes Hinduístas mencionam eventuais desconfortos que uma persistência Muçulmana no litígio pode causar.

De forma menos clara, também se observa um efeito desse litígio sobre uma região onde o Comunalismo entre Muçulmanos e Hinduístas é bem mais tensa; a Cachemira (Jamuu and Kashmir). Ainda muito recente para ter seus contornos claramente delineados, o fato é que logo após o julgamento de Ayodhya houve um recrudescimento por parte de grupos rebeldes separatistas da Cachemira, levando à dissolução do plano de retirada das tropas que ocupam o estado por mais de dez anos.


Conclusão


Embora o recrudescimento na região da Cachemira certamente tenha outras causas, o fato é que a hipótese do julgamento de Ayodhya ter influenciado o retrocesso nas negociações com o estado rebelde não é de todo implausível. Sob essa hipótese, o que se observa seria, portanto, uma expressão reativa de grupos Muçulmanos diante do fato de não se sentirem verdadeiramente indianos, ou, pelo menos, de não se sentirem verdadeiros cidadãos indianos.

Num estado multiétnico, multireligioso, multilinguístico e continental como a Índia, o federalismo constitucional definitivamente não reflete o movimento de forças centrípetas que faz da unidade indiana o maior desafio e, ao mesmo tempo, a maior prova da força deste jovem estado. Diante deste fato, é previsível que a reação Muçulmana ao longo do país não tome o formato histórico da violência na Cachemira, porém, isso não anula o fato de que o sentimento nacionalista morre aos poucos quando o Estado se traveste de oligarquia para convenientemente evadir-se de suas obrigações. É certo que, com ou sem reação violência, a Índia perde um pouco mais de si a cada Muçulmano cabisbaixo que segue vivendo como um estrangeiro ou um apátrida em seu próprio país.

Das tribos originarias ao Estado Indiano pós-Independência, passando pelos tempos Ayuvedicos, Hindu-Arianos, os Califados, o Império Moghul, e o Raj Britânico... Se tomarmos a história da sociedade indiana sob a óptica do Hinduísmo podemos dizer que as diversas vidas desse corpo social são como os Jamns do Hinduísmo, sempre morrendo e sempre revivendo sobre novos corpos, novas chances de enfrentar o destino com a dignidade de quem é capaz de mudá-lo para idealmente encontrar seu Mokshe. Se assim o for, é bom que o Estado indiano seja prudente com essa questão, pois do contrário pode esvaziar-se de sua unidade e morrer para renascer sob o Dharma do fascismo de Estado e do ódio legislado, emprestado suas históricas raízes culturais ao pior da modernidade que lhe foi imposta.



Originally published at: http://boletimneasia.wordpress.com/2011/08/02/boletim-do-neasia-n%C2%BA-83/