THE 16TH SAARC, HELD IN THINPU (BHUTAN) – 2010.

THE 16^TH SAARC, HELD IN THINPU (BHUTAN) – 2010.

This last meeting of the group came under the name of “Towards a Green and Happy South Asia”.

In a movement that weakened the institutional settlement of the organization but possibly strengthened their individual capability to go ahead the rethoric history of promises never lead ahead of the paper, this time the main core was the recover of dialogue between India and Pakistan, ended since the 26-11-2008 terrorist attempt in Mumbay.

This is institutionally harmfull for the SAARC was buil under the clausule of not hosting bilateral differences in its foras.

Pression of all the neighbours and the previous pressure of Obama in his visit to India made India and Pakistan recover dialogue, and that’s clearly the main achievement of the Fora.

However, other dynamics were played, with special emphasis to the Bhutanese goal of improving clean technology transfer and political agreements on management of common goods, mainly watter.

The more concrete decisions on this purpose, however, were barried by the Pakistani refusal of taking part in a Afghani-Bangladeshi road and in a Rapid Response to Natural Disasters Mechanism.

Among the many old projects just in the paper, they mentioned the South Asia University, and settled an academical seminar on the issue to August.

It was also meaningful to note that by the first time civil-society enjoyed a full opinative role, and brought many ideas… it’s expected that this trend continue even after a not so comprehensive chairmanship of the SAAR summit.

The next will be in the Maldives in 2011.

The bilateral approach was not only regarding Indo-Pak… Afghanistan also raised severe critiques to the Pak hosting terrorism.

India didn’t mention that issue in the main speech, just in the parallel meetings and under others auspices… its main speech pointed for the urgency of embodying the vast rethoric of SAARC.

Maldives president stated that the Indo-Pak issue is locking the regional development and urged it to be solved soon… therefore pressuring for the recovery of dialogue.

By its time, Pakistany prime-minister pointed that terrorism is rooted in social-historic lack of justice, implicitly denying its guilt on hosting terrorism and, at the same time, suggesting the continuation of such practices.

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SAARC

SOUTH ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND SAARC

It was just in 1977 that Bangladesh President Zia-ur-Rehman first suggested a regional organization (circuled a report on that).

Some say he pursued that for domestic economical problems.

Developed was the main goal since South-Asia is the n. 1 in poverty and exploding population in world.

ASEAN was settled in 1967

SAARC established in 1985 in Dhaka (India, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives).

India and Pakistan didn’t join promptly for fearing a misuse on each other benefit, therefore they included a clause prohibiting bilateral issues to be arose under SAARC, and also to develop any activity contrasting to bilateral policies.

Same operational framework as the IBSA (TECHNICAL – STANDING COMMITEES-MINISTERS-SUMMITS).

South Asia was the last region to take a regional step in world.

The expansion process of SAARC was initially marked by the Afghani and Myamar possibilities.

In the beginning Myamar was waiting its acceptance in ASEAN and didn’t want SAARC, what was institutionalized after its acceptance in ASEAN

Before the end of the Cold War, Afghanistan framed a regional unbalance favourable to India, therefore Pakistan showed resistence.

After Cold War than there was a process for Afghanistan, but Pakistan was trying also to include other central and north Asian countries as to strength its muslim links… however, in 2006 Afghanistan signed only.

1995 SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement) willing to become a full SAFTA (S. A. Free Trade Agreement) as early as in the first decades of the 21^st century.

Problems: SAARC countries have 97% imports from outside South Asia and export 96% to outside the region

Bilateral issues like Kashmir and Farraka, locking the regional cooperation

Lack of capital

In 1995 Delhi round India offered a list of 106 items for preferencial trade, while the thers offered less than 20 each.

Besides, the items offered by other countries has no demand.

Pakistan refusal to grant India the “most favoured nation status” (this would assure India to have the same trade advantages Pakistan concede to other nations he recognize as being MFN)

India got discontent as Nepal and Maldives supported the Pakistani claim for a mechanism to help settling bilateral issues (it goes against the clause exempting bilateral issues from being raised in SAARC)

After that India has increased it’s “look east policy”

1991 India become a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN

1995 India become a full dialogue partnership

1997 Male Summit took decisive measures to implement SAFTA until 2001, but till now it didn’t become a reality.

Advantages: Intern trade is becoming more necessary as international aid is stoping.

Buthan suggested a S. A. Development Fund (SADF) in 1991, and it started in 1996.

The fund is divided into 3: proposing action; developing actions; and maintaining SAARC activities

They have proposed 13 already.

BRICS SUMMIT 2011

BRICS Summit 2011

With Beijings efforts to focus on economic aspects, limiting political claims to the trade and financial organizations reform, the concession of a place to SA and the emergence of the Libyan issue arose some unexpected political debates (Libya) which lead this summit to produce one of the most meaning joint communiqués in the BRIC history.

First meeting with the South African presence, ratified in December 2010.

The meeting was named “Development, peace and sharing”.

Based on annual growth of trade between partners of 26%, what combined represents 16% of total world GDP and 40% of worlds population.

The South African inclusion is accounted to Chinese efforts which used this symbolical gesture to strengthen links with Africa, on which it depends for raw materials, especially taking the long term perspective.

This inclusion may have caused bad effects on South Africa itself for the alignment with Russia and China can be seen as opposite to the democratic changes being operated since 1990.

Zuma’s declaration that western critiques on China are post-colonialism were very harmfull for their democratic process.

Beijing intentions with the meeting were clearly announced also to foster bilateral conversations in between the 2 days summit.

China-Brazil: Brazil took a 400 businessman commission to foster development in this country; in the last 2 years China has displaced US as Brazil’s larger trading partner; China is also planing to extend its investments in Brazil; Chine refused to built Brazilian Embraer’s planes instead of its owns; Brazil didn’t raise the issue of Chinese forced devaluation, which is a barrier among them… maybe because in the recently held G 20 meeting chineses were imperative on defending their economic sovereignty and accusing US for being imperialistic.

Indio-China: Both countries resumed the exchange of military exchange and joint exercises, which was frozen since last july for China didn’t give the full visa for an Indian-Kashmiri general for implicitly recognizing this region as Pakistani.

Indian interest on that occasion was to safeguard the border limits it has with Pakistan regarding PoK (Azad Kashmir), what can proof to be a landmark for Chinese claims in case India ever gets Kashmir totally back and sit for border negotiations with China.

The relations between them is still very tense for the increasingly Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the Indian closer bonds with US, which contrast to Chinese regional project.

The Chinese interests on BRICS are more economics than political, and it work hard to avoid any political shaping of BRICS as opposing to the international order, as can be notice on the Indian and Russia action, and also on the Brazilian.

China abstain from political reforms propositions other than those regarding the trade and financial system.

The summit arose the issue of reforming IMF, enlarging the role of developing countries, a trend gaining force since last November decision of redistributing the voting power of European countries among developing ones, and also by the Chinese currently position as the 3^rd voting power of IMF.

A point which gained importance in light of the Washington IMF meeting occurring in a short close time, as well as the G 20. Press made a sort of competition between both meetings.

This issue, the political agenda and the issue of replacing the US dollar – raised in 2009 Russia summit – is leading BRICS to oppose US.

Parallel to the summit there was a trade minister’s meeting.

Following Chinese guidelines, the joint cominiqués aimed IMF reforms, control on commodities price fluctuation, and a minor and rethoric statement on environmental issues.

One important political issue was the joint denounce of the bombs in Libya, what can be viewed as an outcome of the South African inclusion since their president – Zuma – was ahead of the rejected AU project of political settlement of the issue, not accepted by the SC for not including clear measures to take Gadaffi of power.

The Indian endorsement of this joint position, as well as its abstention in the SC session on Libya may have caused some barriers on the current process of approximation with US.

However, the Indian position was based also in its personal interests, which accounts for a huge investment and raw material import from this country.

Chinese potential loss there is of 18 million and share on the oil trade

Russia is of 7 million on weapon trade and railway building

Chinese interest on forming a group position against military actions in Libya possible account for its support in the declaration favorable to a UNSC reform and the highlight of the important role to be played by India, Brazil and South Africa.

However, this didn’t clearly mention any permanent seat, neither can be accounted for a shift in the Chinese position against a permanent seat to India.

GENERAL THINGS ABOUT OBAMA'S VISIT TO INDIA

US looks for a refound SC that include India as a permanent member… which was an empty statement.

A more clear US position on that issue would also depend on more clear position regarding important fields such as Kashmir.

In 2010, Obama come to India before the SAARC summit, asked to reduce the Kashmiri tension by talks, however Mamohan Singh stated that talks are just gonna happen once Pakistan stops supporting cross-border terrorism.

26-11-2008 Mumbay attack. Since than India ceased talks with Pakistan, just recovering conversations after the SAARC summit of 2010.

Obama is a fan of Mahatma Gandhi.

India accused US to be soft in the counter terrorism campaign on what concern terrorism not aimed to them, as is the case with Pakistani based groups targeting India.

US is silent on Pakistani cross border terrorism.

His visit kind of settled a dead line for ratifying the Nuclear Liability Bill: a law which limits the responsibility of nuclear enterprises acting in India. It passed through a very difficult parliament ratify but is currently ratified.

It definitely created the background for the approval of it.

Once approved, India has got a green line to go ahead with the nuclear generator agreement of 2008, an important step in the major cooperation agreement of 2005.

Both agreed on effective nuclear energy and arsenal of management, strengthening the 2005 - 123 agreement.

Common cooperation for Afghanistan.

Civil space and defense technology cooperation.

Obama wants to shift India’s traditional sellers of weapons in its favour. Usually the main seller is Israel, and before it was Russia.

In Obama’s campaign he promised to stop the outsourcing of US jobs, but when he came to India he didn’t mention about it, what was a worry for US analysts. However, he fostered the signature of many trade agreements between private investors, accounting for 10 million just in the first of his 3 days visit. According to him, this would create 54,000 jobs in US, not counting outsourcing jobs.

INDIAS EXTEND ON LIBYAN CRISIS

Indias extend on libyan crisis:

Indian Foreign Ministry stated that does not sympathize with Omar Gadaffi but is against use of force in humanitarian issues.

Despite the jurisprudencia which could lead to a further similar action regardin Pakistan or the Indo-Chinese contested areas, India also has huge investment in Lybia.

Claims that change is supposed to came by peoples force.

Therefore, India abstent from voting on the SC pledging it was not clear regarding the situation in Lybia.

Brazil, Germany, China, Russia all abstent from voting also.

18.000 Indian nationals were there, 15.000 were called back, but 3.000 opted to stay there.

No impact in India China or India Russia, but maybe a small harm with USA and France, which supported the action.

China is mainly concerned about its economy since it is the greatest investor in Lybia.

INDIAN POLITICS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

INDIA – MIDDLE EAST

India is geographically dependent of the Indian Ocean corridors for its trade, and historically dependent of the Gulf of Persia supply of Oil. It actually account for 70% of Indian sources of Oil.

The Suez Chanel and the Gulf of Persia set the main corridors for Indian western guided trade.

Iran – Iraq Indian good relations based on oil trade until the 80’s helped to keep Islamic countries support after the wars with Pakistan.

India’s refusal to sign the Bagda Pact (actually CENTO) in 1954, made it easier to keep non-aligned presence in the Middle East, and kept the alliances even after Iraq quit the treaty.

New Delhi's anti-Israeli stance in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and by Indian support for the fourfold oil price rise in 1973 by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

India’s silence for 1979 Afghanistan seizure by URSS was understood as a pro-URSS movement, which however had the bad output of strengthening the strategically importance of Pakistan to the US, therefore reviving the weapon cooperation recently interrupted by the parliamentary amendment against nuclear developing countries.

1980-88 Iran-Iraq War forced India to shift its oil purchases from Iran and Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states

India kept neutrality

In the Gulf War to release Kwait, India tried to keep discret, but in a conturbed decision allowed refueling of US airplanes in Mumbay for a short while before domestic pressions baned the agreement.

Along those years India also expanded its influence and oil dependency to northeast African countries, including Libya, therefore creating difficulties for any condemnation in the SC meeting on Gadaffi.

In the G. W. Bush war, India condemned US unauthorized action.

India had to sign the Facility Nuclear Treaty (2008) and the 123 Agreement (2005 Indo-US Agreement) with US, than it couldn’t transfer technology to non-nuclear states according to the AIEA list. For that, in 2007 and 2011 India couldn’t vote for them. The clause made India commit to vote against, not allowing eventual abstentions to happen.

But despite this, Iran plays a major role in counterbalancing US-Pakistan influence in central Asia in favor of India.

THE ROLE OF AUTARKY ON INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

AUTARKY

Autarky refers basically to the economic goal of self-suficiency and non-dependency.

MOMENT 1:

The goal of autarky lead India to adopt Non-Alignment as a tool to get technologic transfers and reach economic self-suficiency.

MOMENT 2:

Due to the economic fiasco of Indira Ghandi and Rajiv Gandhi, the US offered help under liberalization and devaluation of the Rupee. She just devaluated, but Narashima Rao latter liberalized.

In 1991 India adopted the LPG under Narashima Rao P.M. and Mamohan Singh as Financial Minister.

Gujral (1996-97) said that diplomatic relations with U.S. should be strengthened and that, instead of looking abroad, India should look for the neighbors.

Vajpayee (1998-2004) emphasized more the US approximation and kept with the liberalization process.

INDIAN NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY

NATIONAL INTEREST AND FOREIGN POLICY

• The concept of national interest as a goal of foreign policy is universal and static, but the actual national interest of any particular state is both specific and dynamic (Bandyopadhyaya).

• Realist (Kautilya; Chandragupta Maurya; Samudragupta) and Utopians (Gandhi; Sri Aurobindo; Rabindranath Tagore) in Indian politics.

• Jawahar Lal Nehru defined idealism as the realism of tomorrow… he tried to create a synthesis.

• Public opinion tends to remain passive in foreign policy, except in crisis situations (Bandyopadhyaya).

• Dictatorships tend to produce irrational determination of national interests (Bandyopadhyaya).

• Generally talking, national interest is based first on security and second on national development (Bandyopadhyaya).

• Categories of security (understood as safeguarding of territorial integrity; sovereignty; lifes and properties… which priority of importance is given according to particular situations):

  • Internal and External.

  • Short-term and Long-term.

  • Security outside frontiers and of frontiers.

    • Bandyopadhyaya points that “the striving for national security outside state boundaries must assume a diplomatic rather than a military orientation, and be restricted primarily to the development of international law, world government, and its essential ingredient, collective security”.

    • Quotes the risks of external hegemony to the national security of ordinary countries, highlighting that this is the case in the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) and CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).

• Regarding national development, foreign policy is influenced by national development

• The issue of national development is what drives countries to express different views of world order on which different patterns of security are advocated according to the national aspirations and necessities of each state.

• Bandyopadhyaya points that national development is primarily a matter of domestic policy, although they can be indirectly reached through foreign policy.

• Ways of interaction of foreign policy and national development:

  • Defense: Long-run defense capability, as distinguished from short-run militarism, is primarily dependent on the development of an economic structure.

  • Diplomacy: The science of conducting the foreign relations of a state with view to promoting its national interest.

    • For analytical reasons, Bandyopadhyaya accounts for the diplomacy division into branches, such as Political Diplomacy, Military Diplomacy; Economic Diplomacy, and Cultural Diplomacy.

    • Bandyopadhyaya points that although closely related to the political aspect of diplomacy, the military aspect has tended to become increasingly specialized in contemporary international relations.

    • Hegemonic security regimes, like the NPT and the CTBT, call for vigorous counter-hegemonic politico-military diplomacy on the part of India and other Third World states.

      1. Accounts Pokram II nuclear explosion (1998) to be one example of this counter-hegemonic politico-military diplomacy.

    • Between political and military diplomacy, the former would have precedence over the latter as the main instrument for the promotion of national security and other components of national interest.

  • Communication: Credibility is an essential condition for the success of international propaganda and political achievements on the long-run.

BASIC DETERMINANTS OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

• Geography

• Its importance into foreign policy has been historically highlighted by Kautilya and Aristotele (not very articulated contributions); Victor Cousin (very determinist); Karl Haushofer (very determinist); Friedrich Ratzel; Captain Alfred Mahan; E. C. Semple; Huntington; Rudolf Kjellen, Halford MacKinder.

• Bandyopadyana points that aerial navigation and the technological sophistication of warfare in the nuclear age have led to a serious depreciation of geopolitics.

  • Points that India and most of its neighbors still will need a long time to develop technology enough to reduce the importance of the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.

• V. N. Khana see great importance of geography also regarding the Ganga waters dispute with Bangladesh (Farakka dam 1962-71; 1972), the river changing course (Belonia Sector, 1979), emerging islands (New Moore Island, 1971-1980-…) and corridor areas of Indian territory into Bangladesh (1982-…). As well as the strategic advantage of Chinese in the McMahon line, in east Himalayan borders.

• Location: Between the highest mountain range of the world in the north and one of the three major oceans of the world in the south, Bandyopadhyan claims that Indian subcontinent has certain geographical insularity.

  • West border and corridor to Afghanistan.

    1. Khyber Pass, in the north-west, now under Pakistan rule, was the only major opening in the subcontinent’s land frontier, leading to Afghanistan.

       • Historical path of invaders penetration into Indian subcontinent.

• The Himalayas from West to East:

  1. In its extreme north-west there’s Azad Kashmir (currently under Pakistani rule), which is contiguous to the Sinkiang province of China.

     • At least 8 important passes in the Karakoram mountain linking to Sinkiang and one all weather motorable road from early ages.

       • Not difficult to protect militarily, although politically complex for joining China and Pakistan.

  2. Ladakh area claimed by India but currently under Chinese rule since the 1962 war, still without a formal agreement on the border limits.

     • There are at least 10 important passes leading to Sinkiang and Tibet, all them under Chinese rule.

     • There’s also an early route from Haji Langkar to Aksai Chin until close to Saring Jilgnang lake in Tibet, which has been recently paved and connected to the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.

     • China built another road to the West which enters Sinkiang through Thag La and cross to Tibet through Lanak La, connecting to Sinkian-Tibet Highway.

     • The Sinkiang-Tibet Highway goes from Gartok (Himachal Pradesh) to Taklatok, on the borders of Uttar Pradesh, Nepal and Tibet.

       • Since India claims the occupied area of Ladakh, the security balance is very favorable to the Chinese since they control ALL the passes between Ladakh and Tibet.

         • India just have a narrow strip of the Ladakh-Tibet frontier, which has no important passes.

  3. Northern border of Himachal Pradesh.

     • Contains the important pass of Shipki, passing through Gartok (Tibet), built by China and also linked to the Sinkiang –Tibet Highway.

     • The other pass is the Spiti La.

  4. Northern border of Uttar Pradesh with Tibet.

     • Contains at least eleven passes, all of them within easy reach of the Sinkiang-Tibet Highway.

  5. Tibet-Nepal border.

     • The penetration is very difficult and just happen in Nara Pass, Kodari Pass, and Rasa Pass.

       • The Kodari Pass is actually a part of the Lhasa-Katmandu road, built by China under bilateral agreement, which is a modernized version of the old Kodari-Lhasa trade route.

     • Those passes are meaning for Indian security for they give passage to the plains shared between Nepal, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, an advantageous area for any military action aiming the Indo-Gangetic plain.

  6. Sikkim-Tibet border (relatively short).

     • Despite the short border, there are several easily traversable passes, the most important being the Nathu La, which goes through the Chumbi Valley (border between Sikkim, China and Bhutan).

       • Nathu La is close to the motorable Lhasa-Yatung road in Tibet.

       • Chinese army has a military aerodrame close to there.

         • Important cities like Calcutta lie within easy bombing range from the Chumbi Valley.

       • The Chumbi valley belongs to the only corridor linking India to Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts of West Bengal, and hence the Indo-Bhutanese border.

       • Sikkim population is more similar to Tibetans than Indians and that area is rich on minerals.

       • Sikkim used to be an independent kingdom that passed to Indian protectorate in 1950 and was merged into Indian Territory in 1975 under its own claims.

       • This, however, has arose Chinese protests interested on transforming its recognition in a bargaining coin, mainly aiming a settlement regarding the limits after the 1962 war and Indian energetic recognition of Taiwan and Tibet as Chinese settled possessions.

         • In fact, India already accepted those areas, just claiming more autonomy to Tibet.

       • The disagreements lead to the enclosure of Nathu La, which was just reopened in 2006.

     • In 2003 China showed intention of recognizing Sikkim by implicitly recognizing it while engaging in a joint effort to build another pass road.

       • In 2004 China ceased even to call Sikkim and independent nation annexed by China, being so the last country to recognize the merge.

     • Those passes may be important to the fulfillment of the Free Trade Agreement both country signed under the ASEAN.

       • Currently, there’s a joint study group established in 2003.

  7. No recognizable pass between Buthan and Tibet.

     • Because China does not agree with the limit line.

• Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan all have the strategic disadvantage of being in the lower position of the Himalayan highs in the border with China.

8. India’s Arunachal Pradesh (Formerly North-East Frontier Agency).

*Kameng district

• China claim all this state, which is actually vastly occupied by Chinese forces after the 1962 war.

• Very close to the border are the roads of Thag La and Bum La, by which an ancient rout connects Khinzemane (China) and Towang (India).

  • This was the route used by the Chinese army in 1962.

*Subansiri district

• Has no pass and China has made no incursion, though this area is strongly claimed and was attacked in 1962 war.

*Luhit district

• Two important openings: Kangri Karpo in the North and Walong Sector in the East.

• Chinese attacked those areas in 1962.

i. The eastern frontier between Assam and Myammar (Burma).

• Despite the sub-Himalayan hills and jungles, there are some easy points to penetrate on Both, China and India, therefore creating a possible corridor by which China could use to entry India.

• In 2001 Myanmar built Tamu-Kalemyo-Kalewara road, linking Imphal with Yangon.

• It has brought good prospects for the trade development among India and Myanmar.

• Indian Ocean also offers some insularity aspect.

• India and the Indian Ocean are an indispensable link in world trade and commerce.

• The ocean is of great relevance to the oil trade, being the corridor for 60% of the Europe consume and 90% of Japanese consume.

• Locked by earth, India depends on the ocean to its trade.

• Free navigability of the Suez Canal, Persian Gulf, South African Coast and the Straits of Malaca is essential for the uninterrupted flow of Indian trade.

• British starategy to safeguard the Ocean counted on protecting the Persian Gulf from Ormuz, the Red Sea from Socotra, the South African route from the African Cost, and the Straights of Malacca from Malacca, with a further naval base in Singapure.

• In a first moment after independence nothing has change in this Ocean surveillance, but latter the British withdrawn from Suez and Singapure in the early seventies.

• Filling this gap and under the auspices of the Cold War, U.S.A sent its 7^th flotilla (nuclear power) and URSS intensified its presence, still in the 1970’s.

  • U.S.A presence is also based on the ANZUS and SEATO initiatives.

• There’s some suspicious on the US intention for the nuclear capability of its submarines and also for their large bases in Japan, Philipines, Thailand, Western Australia, Bahrain (the Persian Gulf fleet is stationed), Ethiopia, Djibuti and the Diego Garcia island.

  • Diego Garcia is of great concern for it is very close to India and Sri Lanka, it is the permanent base for the 7^th flotilla and also host very powerful and long range nuclear weapons.

  • This was the base of the Iraq attack in 1991.

  • Those suspicious are strengthened by the relatively weak Chinese naval strength and the shift in the Japanese imperialist policy into a more friendly one after the World War II.

    1. However weak, the Chinese presence is increasing, and after their settlement in Myammar’s Coco Island, India decided to settle a Far Eastern Naval Command (FENC) in Andaman and Nicobar Islands (1990), just 40 km distance from Coco Island.

    2. In 2001, India settled a defense pact with Indonesia and upgraded the FENC to a Far Eastern Command (FEC), deploying the three forces in Port Blair.

    3. Politically, India is improving its strength by becoming a full dialogue partner of ASEAN (1995), establishing the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORAC) in 1997, by joining the Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka- Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) in 1997, and the Ganga-Mekong Cooperation (GMC) in 2000.

• The Himalayan and the Karacoram do constitute some barrier to trade, but not so much to attacks which have been managed to happen.

• The protection of Himalayan must count on light armed troops and mostly on local population’s support.

• Contrasting to the insularity, there’s also an element of centrality as India lays at the center of the great Asian arc stretching from Aden to Tokyo.

• Geographicaly settled as a bridge between the West and the East, India used to be described by Nehru as inevitably involved in major global issues.

  • This proved to be true during the Cold War in which both poles were concerned about gaining India strategic position and India managed to use it on the behalf of Non-Alignment Doctrine.

• Size: Ratzel lebensrau’sadvocated that big states tend to be broad-minded while small states narrow-minded.

• In the Indian case, the fact is that its large size makes very difficult for any occupation of the whole territory by a country without great difference in military power.

• Demography and population

• Indian large population can lead to scarcity problems.

• Big populations are not so easily converted into military capabilities, for economic strength to do that is the real point.

  • Specially in the age of technological wars.

• Indian vast population has a migratory aspect which may lead to problems with other countries due to mistreatment of Indians abroad.

  • Persecution to Ethinc Tamils in Sri Lanka.

    • The refugees/people without nationality issue.

      1. Nehru-Kotewala Agreement (1953): Failure to implement.

      2. Shastri-Sirimavo Agreement (1964 Lal Bahadur Shastri ; 1974 Indira Ghandi).

• The riots settlement issue (1971-1983-1987-1990-1991-1995-…): The Tamil separatist movement of 1971 arose a Tamil persecution from 1983 which lead the Sri Lankan government (Jayawardene) to request Indian Peace Keeping Force intervention in 1987. This however was useless and arose critics to Indian ‘imperialism’ and ethnic riots linked to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi assassination in 1991, one year after he withdrew from Sri Lanka. In 1995 Narashima Rao and Mrs. Kumaratung signed an agreement on economic cooperation and joint protection of fishermans and refugees.

  1. The 1971 separatist movement is believed to have caused a Sri Lankan neutrality in the Bangladesh independence which indeed can be accounted as a support for Pakistan.

• Kacchativu Dispute: The ‘sacred’ island got into formal Sri Lankan possession after the 1974 agreement.

• Indians facing problems in Fiji.

• The creation of a Division for NRIs and People of Indian Origin abroad in the Ministry of External Affairs in 2000 was a measure concerning the relevance of demography in its foreign policy.

• Economics

• India depends on economic strength to convert its natural resources into concrete advantages.

  • Indian foreign policy has always accounted for the transfer of technology from developed countries as a way to fill its gaps, and this is a root cause behind the Non-Alignment policy .

    • This policy aimed to keep mutual friend with both poles during the cold war and then gaining from both them. It was a claim for independent political decision of developing countries despite of the great powers own logics and interests.

      1. It is not neutralism, neutralization, equidistance, unilateralism or isolacionism: Because it seeks mutual friendship and the right to choose under domestical interests and not under global forces driven by great powers globalized logics.

      2. Is a Nehruvean policy influenced by the British Workers Party liberal-socialism.

    • It was globally launched in Belgrade 1961, by India, Yugoslavia and Egipt, and today count on around 118 members.

    • There are 5 criterias to join the NAM:

      1. Follow a sovereign Non Alignment policy;

      2. Opose to colonialism and imperialism;

      3. Not be a member of any Cold War related military bloc;

         • However Pakistan was a NAM and also belonged to the CENTO initiative (1955 – Bagda Pact), which was a U.S. anti-communist device for West Asia/ Middle East that India has earlier refused to take part.

      4. Not to have a bilateral treaty with any superpower;

         • Pakistan had with the U.S:

           • 1954 weapon supply agreement: Aiming to punish India refuse to take part in CENTO, and to limit Indian power.

           • 1959 weapon supply agreement: Aiming to substitute the Iraq, which abandoned CENTO, by Paquistan in the Middle East control.

             • India complaint for USA bringing the CENTO to its doors and arming Pakistan, but USA assured those weapons could not be used against India (but they was latter).

           • Rupture of the weapon and economic supply for both countries because of the 1965 war.

           • 1968 sent of 100 tanks M-47.

           • 1970 sent of B-57 bomber aircrafts and other weapons.

           • 1979 suspension of assistance for Pakistan due to their nuclear program.

           • 1979 recover of nuclear cooperation with Pakistan after the URSS size of Afghanistan arose the Pakistani geographical importance in the Central Asia dynamics.

             • 16 F-40 aircrafts selled to Pakistan.

           • 1981 U.S. alert to Pakistan on the possibility of Indian strikes against Pakistani nuclear installations.

           • 1985 Pressler Amendment cut assistances due to their military program, but kept the weapon trade.

           • 1995 Brown Amendment modified Pressler Amendment assuring exemption rights for Pakistan regarding their non-assistance policy for nuclear developing countries.

           • 1995, Senator Ton Harkins and John Warner raised the idea of trainmen tot Pakistani forces to assure safety for overseas private investment corporations.

         • Pakistan had with China:

           • Continuous

         • India had with URSS:

           • 1971 Indian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

             • Signed under the Bangladesh imminent war and due to the US-Chinese-Pakistani coalition.

             • 1972 Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement.

           • 1991 renew of Indian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship.

           • 2002 reafirmation of Russian commitment to expand nuclear cooperation under the limits of its international agreements.

           • 2003 joint critique of the U.S.A. non-authorized invasion of Iraq.

         • India had with U.S.A:

           • 1962 unconditional support to India against China and weapon supply.

           • Rupture of the weapon and economic supply for both countries because of the 1965 war.

             • Lead to a rupee devaluation.

           • Early 1990’s naval joint exercises.

           • 1991 refuel permission to U.S. planes in the Gulf War.

           • 1998 Senator Burton’s attempt to prohibit aid to India due to the Human Rights condition in Kashmir, which however didn’t pass.

             • It was aiming the 1997 Clinton’s proposal of sending aid to India.

           • 1999 U.S.A demand for Pakistan to withdrawn from Kargil area and support to India in the war.

           • 2000, U.S.A endorsed the Indian position according to which the Kashmir conversations must come after the pacification of LoC zone.

           • In 2003 there was the joint idea of a Proliferation Security Initiative of providing military support for countries engaged in cohabiting nuclear illegal trade.

           • 2005, Indo-American Nuclear Agreement to separate India’s civil and military nuclear facilities in exchange for ‘the trinity’ technologies of trade, space and civilian nuclear energy .

             • Criticized for the U.S. does not formally accept India as a nuclear state;

             • Has no abandonment clause and makes harder to quit than the NPT and CTBT theirselves.

             • India is not willing to accept the Hyde Act Amendments according to which the cooperation would end in case India did another test.

             • India is not willing to accept the 123 agreement against the reprocess of used fuel.

• The need of foreign developed countries to Indian industrialization is decreasing as globalization unfold a wave of Foreign Direct Investments bringing technology to India.

• The oil dependency of the Gulf States supply leads to a vast drain of foreign exchange reserves, causing a devaluation of the Rupee.

  • This dependency has also lead India to play a very cautious diplomacy with Persian Gulf/ West-Asia countries.

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